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Abstract 
 This paper derives a basic formula for the measure of social welfare, a second 
order approximation to the difference of the value of the Bergson-Samuelson 
social welfare function between the socially optimal resource allocation and the 
one in the present suboptimal economy. We discuss pros and cons of our approach 
for the measurement of welfare compared with other approaches to applied 
welfare economics, especially the measurement of deadweight loss.  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present our basic formula for the measure of 
social welfare and discuss its pros and cons compared with other approaches to 
applied welfare economics.  Up to now, approaches for measuring the economic 
performance of the society chiefly concentrated to the measurement of inefficiency 
such as deadweight loss.  In some circumstances, however, it becomes essential 
to evaluate the equity aspect of the economic policy at the same time as efficiency.  
We present a methodology for evaluating the social welfare directly instead of 
evaluating the efficiency loss to answer the question. 
We introduce our model in the next section.  In section 3, our point is 
elaborated by taking a second order approximation to the linear social welfare 
function when tax distortions prevail.  In section 4, the economic implications of 
our approach are discussed, especially in comparison with literatures on the 
measurement of deadweight loss, which include Hotelling (1938), Hicks (1942), 
Allais (1943, 1977), Boiteux (1951), Debreu (1951, 1954), Harberger (1964), and 
Diewert (1981, 1984, 1985).  Section 5 briefly concludes. 
  
2. The Model 
Let us set up the model of our economy.  There are H  consumers having 
quasi-concave utility functions  defined over a translated 
orthant 
Hhhxhf ,,1),( K=
Th
Nx
hxhxhQ ),,1(  where K≡  is a consumption vector of goods  by 
the -th consumer. The initial endowment vector of the -th consumer is given 
by 
N,,1 K
h h
Hhhx ,,1, K= .  There are K  firms and firm  produces  using the 
production possibilities set , which are subsets of the 
k ky
KkkS ,,1, K=
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N -dimensional nonnegative orthant and satisfies standard regularity properties. 
We define the expenditure function:1
 
(1)  . })(:{min),( huhxhfhxTpxhup
hm h ≥≡
 
where . See Diewert (1982; 554) for the regularity properties that must be 
satisfied by the functions .   
Np 0〉〉
hm
The profit function  is defined as Kkk ,,1, K=π
(2)  . KkSyypp kTxk ,,1},:{max)( K=∈≡π
The regularity properties of the profit function are summarized in Diewert (1982; 
580-1). 
 We assume below that the production possibilities sets  are 
convex. We also assume for simplicity that markets are complete and that the only 
source of distortions is indirect taxes levied on consumers.  Extensions of these 
assumptions are not difficult.  See Diewert (1983, 1986) and Tsuneki (1987, 
1995). 
kS Kk ,,1, K=
   Generally, the desirable properties of the ordering of social states are 
summarized in the Bergson-Samuelsonian social welfare function (BSSWF 
hereafter).  (See Samuelson (1956) for a discussion of the BSSWF and its 
properties listed below.)  We first assume that the underlying social ordering is 
compatible with the Pareto partial ordering (i.e., if all individual utilities increase, 
                                                  
1  means that each element of the vector Nx 0〉〉 x  is strictly positive,  means that 
each element of 
Nx 0≥
x  is nonnegative, and  means  but .  A 
superscript 
Nx 0> Nx 0≥ Nx 0≠
T  means transpose. 
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then so does social welfare) so that the resulting BSSWF becomes Pareto-inclusive.  
Suppose also that the evaluation of social states is individualistic (or welfarist); 
i.e., the utility vector  prevailing at the state is the only information used in the 
evaluation.  Also suppose that the evaluation takes the form of a continuous 
ordering of utility vectors.  Then, Debreu’s (1959; 56) representation theorem is 
applied to get the BSSWF, .  Pareto-inclusiveness implies that  is 
monotone increasing in . 
u
)(uS S
u
   We introduce the value of BSSWF at the socially optimal allocation and its 
value at the present tax-distorted equilibrium.  We call the numerical difference 
of the value of these two resource allocations BSSW measure of welfare.? For the 
numerical evaluation of the difference of the value of BSSWF to be meaningful, 
we assume below that each individual’s utility is measurable on a cardinal scale 
with a unique zero and that utility functions are identical. Furthermore, we 
assume that utilities are interpersonally comparable.2
   In deriving the formula for BSSW measure, we first characterize the socially 
optimal resource allocation in the form of mathematical programming as follows: 
(3)   
.},1,;
1
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s.t.))(,),2(2),1(1({,xMax h
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   Hereafter we strengthen the assumption on the utility functions 
, so that they are concave following Negishi (1960).  
Furthermore we assume that  is concave with respect to  by introducing an 
Hhhxhf ,,1),( K=
S u
                                                  
2 This kind of assumption is not at all exceptional in the study of public economics and 
practical policy analysis. See Feldstein(1976; 79). For a more detailed discussion for justifying 
the assumption of identical utility functions among individuals, see also Mirrlees(1982). 
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explicit value judgment for equity by the social planner.
? ? ? At this point, we use the concept of the overspending function B  which is 
defined as  
∑∑∑ === −−≡ Kk khHh ThHh h pxquqmupqB 111 )(),(),,( π . 
In Appendix I, B  is restated with its economic interpretation and its useful 
properties are summarized.  Using the Uzawa (1958; 34) - Karlin (1959; 201) 
Saddle-point Theorem using the definition (1), (2) and (A.1), we can rewrite (3) as 
follows3 (the calculation is in Appendix II): 
(4)   )},,()({0MinMax uppBuSpu N −≥ . 
We assume that (i) ( ) solves (4), (ii) the first order conditions for (4) hold 
with equality so that , (iii) 
0,0 pu
Np 0
0 〉〉 B  is twice continuously differentiable at the 
optimum, and (iv)  is negative definite.  From assumptions (i) and (ii), 
we find the first order conditions for (4) are: 
00
ppBqqB +
(5)   ),,()( uppBuuSu ∇=∇ , 
(6)   0),,(),,( =∇−∇− uppBquppBp , 
where  .]/,,2/,1/[)( THuSuSuSuSu ∂∂∂∂∂∂≡∇ K
Condition (6) is the equality of demand and supply at the optimum while (5) is the 
rule to equate the marginal social importance of each person to the inverse of his 
marginal utility of income (see Negishi (1960)).4  Note that the solution depends 
on  implies that a distributive value judgment of the social planner is )(uSu∇
                                                  
3 We also assume that the Slater constraint qualification condition applies in this economy; 
i.e., we require that a feasible solution for (3) exists that satisfies the first  inequality 
constraints strictly. 
N
4 With appropriate lump-sum transfers across households, the budget constraints of 
individuals are satisfied and the government budget constraint is implied by them and (6). 
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explicitly introduced. 
   In principle, it is possible to compute socially optimal resource allocation and 
its associated  so that we can compute the BSSF measure globally.  The 
numerical general equilibrium approach by Shoven and Whalley (1972, 1973, 
1977) which computes equilibria directly corresponding to various tax and 
expenditure policies should be helpful in this process.  However, an obvious 
drawback of the numerical general equilibrium approach is that we must have 
information on global functional forms of utility and production functions.  
Furthermore, in the numerical general equilibrium approach, very restrictive 
functional forms are adopted to make global computation possible, and these 
restrictions are easily rejected in econometric tests using more general functional 
forms (see Jorgenson (1984; 140)). 
)0(uS
   In contrast, local approximation approach we adopt in the sections that follow, 
only local information of these functions is required, and it does not involve any 
numerical computations that are more complicated than a single matrix inversion 
whereas the global computation of the social optimum often causes substantial 
numerical difficulties.? Therefore in this paper, we concentrate on the study of 
approximate measures of welfare.  Specifically, we derive a second order 
approximation to the BSSW measure. 
 
3.  Second Order Approximation 
   To compute the second order approximation to the BSSW measure around the 
optimal equilibrium, we first construct a -equilibrium: z
(7)   zzuSzuzptzzpB uu λ+∇=+∇ ))(())(),(,)(( ; 
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(8)          0))(),(,))(())(),(,)(( =+∇−+∇− zuzptzzpBpzuzptzzpBq . 
When , (7) and (8) coincide with the first order conditions for the maximum 
of social welfare (5) and (6), if we define  and .  When 
0=z
0)0( uu ≡ 0)0( pp ≡ 1=z , 
(8) is a set of equations to show the market clearing conditions at the tax-distorted 
equilibrium, if  and  are the values prevailing at the observed 
distorted equilibrium.  If we assume that the level of lump-sum transfers from 
the government to consumers is appropriately chosen, there exist budget 
constraints for consumers compatible with (7) and (8).  (8) and these budget 
constraints imply the budget balance of the government.  When , (7) 
quantifies the ‘equity’ distortions at the observed equilibrium; i.e., 
1)1( uu ≡ 1)1( pp ≡
1=z
hλ−  shows 
the difference between the marginal social importance of the -th person and the 
inverse of his marginal utility of income.  It must be noted that both  
and the marginal utility of income are not invariant to a monotone transformation 
of .  However, they are adjusted proportionally so that (5) is valid.  We 
must also adjust 
h
)(uSu∇
)( hx
hf
hλ  proportionally to ’s marginal utility of income and 
 so that (7) is valid. 
h
)(uSu∇
   Now differentiate (7) and (8) with respect to ; z
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where .  Note that upqjizuSij
z
ijSzuzptzzpBij
z
ijB ,,,for ))((
2)),(),(,)((2 =∇≡+∇≡
NH
z
upB ×= 0 .  Assumptions (iii) and (iv) guarantee, via the Implicit Function 
Theorem, that once continuously differentiable functions  and  
satisfying (9) exist at  close to 0.  Premultiplying  to both sides of 
)(zu )(zp
z ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ TzpTH )(,0
 7
(9) and using property (iii) of the overspending function in Appendix I, we show in 
Appendix III that  
(10)  
,)('))('(                                  
)())(,)((
1
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++=
′+= ∇∑
zuzquB
TttzpzqqB
Ttz
zhuzhutzzp
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is derived.  Evaluating (10) at 0=z , we get 
(11)      . ∑ = =′∇Hh huhuphmu1 0)0()0,0(
We next differentiate (10) with respect to , and evaluate at  to obtain  z 0=z
(12)  
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Premultiplying (9) evaluated at 0=z  by ])0(,0[ TpTH ′  and adding the resulting 
identity to (12), we have  
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   A second order Taylor approximation to the BSSW measure LBSSW at 0=z  is 
as follows: 
(14)     
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   Substituting (5) into (11), we have   Substituting it and (5), 
(13) into (14), we finally have  
.0)0()0( =′∇ uTuSu
(15)            
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where the inequality comes from the concavity of B  with respect to , the 
positive semidefiniteness of , which is implied by the concavity of the utility 
functions, the negative semidefiniteness of  implied by the concavity of the 
 qp  and  
0
uuB
0
uuS
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BSSWF. 
 
4. Implications 
The remarkable advantage of the approximation approach relative to the 
numerical general equilibrium approach is that it can be implemented from the 
derivatives of the overspending function evaluated at the optimum equilibrium, so 
that we need not know global functional forms for utility and production functions.  
As an important corollary of this fact, our approximate measure can be derived 
from any set of flexible functional forms using local information around the 
equilibrium.  However, as long as we must know the derivatives at the optimum 
as in (15), we must actually know the optimal prices so that we must compute the 
optimum or we must depend on some ‘guessing’ process about the values at the 
optimum.  Harberger (1964) suggested replacing these (unobservable) 
derivatives by those which are evaluated at the observed distorted equilibrium, 
since they can be calculated using data prevailing at the observed equilibrium. 
   We now compare the empirical implementability of  in (15) and (9) and 
the usual approximate deadweight loss measure represented by Debreu (1954), 
Harberger (1964) and especially Diewert (1985).  Despite their apparent 
similarities, their meanings are completely different.  First, (15) includes a pure 
equity term  which does not exist in the measurement of 
deadweight loss.  Second,  and 
BSSWL
)0(][)0( 00 uBSu uuuu
T ′−′
)0(p′ )0(u′  calculated from (9) are also affected 
by the pure equity termλ . 
   In (15), we need both the substitution matrices  and income effect 
matrices , tax rates  and the distributional distortion parameters 
1,1 qqBppB
1
quB t λ  so that 
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the informational requirements are much higher than the usual measurement of 
deadweight loss.  Though it is possible to calculate  from local 
information on ordinary demand curves and supply curves at the distorted 
equilibrium, we have to know the marginal utility of income  
to compute 
1and1 qqBppB
)1,1,1( uptpBu +∇
λ  from (7) or  from ordinary demand curves.  As the marginal 
utility of income is not an operational concept without knowing its original utility 
function, in light of these observations, we must conclude that the approximate 
BSSW measure lacks empirical operationality without a knowledge of the original 
utility functions whereas the measurement of deadweight loss is free from this 
problem. 
1
quB
   It is chiefly for this reason that standard literature has concentrated to the 
computation of deadweight loss instead of BSSWF.  Needless to say, however, the 
informational advantage of using the deadweight does not mean that it is a 
superior measure to the BSSW measure of welfare.  As long as we can measure 
the difference between the first order weight of a BSSWF and the inverse of the 
marginal utility of income, the same type of analysis in the measurement of 
deadweight loss can be carried out using a BSSWF.  As we have stressed thus far, 
adopting a BSSWF is superior to measuring deadweight loss for the evaluation 
based on the BSSWF can capture both efficiency of equity aspect of the economy. 
   The only equity-concerned welfare measure we know is the one originated by 
Boiteux (1951), which was taken up again recently by Diewert (1981, 1984, 1985).  
Boiteux’x measure takes the sum of Hicksian (1942; 128) equivalent variations 
where its reference prices vector is chosen from the viewpoint of normative equity.  
Unfortunately, this reference prices vector is difficult to compute.  In addition, 
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the second order approximation of the Boiteux measure requires the information 
on the hypothetical income vector at the optimum which is difficult to obtain (see 
Diewert (1984; 36)).  In contrast, we can avoid this problem by explicitly 
assuming the form of utility functions and the comparability of utilities across 
individuals as value judgment of the social planner.  In this sense, our approach 
to measure the value of BSSWF directly seems much more natural way to 
evaluate the performance of the economy including both equity and efficiency. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Present analysis has derived our basic formula for the measure of social 
welfare. Although it demands more information for its measurement than usual 
analysis of the deadweight loss, it has an important significance because it can 
evaluate both efficiency and equity aspect of the economy. We hope that our study 
serves for the future policy analysis. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I:  The Properties of the Overspending Function. 
   An overspending function, introduced into economics by Bhagwati, Brecher 
and Hatta (1983; 608) summarizes the general equilibrium relations of an 
economy within one equation.  It may be interpreted as the aggregate net 
expenditure of consumers facing prices  minus the aggregate profits of firms 
facing prices 
q
p .  It inherits many useful properties of expenditure functions and 
profit functions which are exhibited in Diewert (1982).  We collect several 
important properties for later use. 
   An overspending function is defined by  
(A.1)       ∑∑ ∑ == = −−≡ Kk kHh Hh hThh pxquqmupqB 11 1 )(),(),,( π . 
It has the following properties. 
   (i)  B  is concave with respect to p and . q
   (ii)  If  is once continuously differentiable with respect to  and ),,( upqB q p  
at , then  is the aggregate net consumption vector 
and  is the aggregate net production vector. 
),,( upq ),,( upqBq∇
),,( upqBp∇−
(iii) The following identities are valid for any  if ),,( upq B  is twice 
continuously differentiable at : ),,( upq
(A.2)                             TNqqB
Tq 0= , 
(A.3)         ,   )/),(,,1/)1,(1()( HuHuqHmuuqmTBuquBTq ∂∂∂∂=∇= K
(A.4)                             TNppB
Tp 0= ,      
where . upqjiupqBijijB ,,,for),,(
2 =∇≡
   Property (i) follows from the fact that an expenditure function is concave with 
respect to prices and a profit function is convex with respect to prices.  Property 
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(ii) is a straightforward consequence of Hotelling’s (1932; 594) lemma and the 
Hicks (1946; 331)-Shephard (1953; 11) lemma.  Property (iii) is a consequence of 
the linear homogeneity of an expenditure function and a profit function with 
respect to prices. 
 
Appendix II 
   In this Appendix, we show that (3) and (4) are equivalent given concave utility 
functions and convex production sets, provided the Slater constraint qualification 
holds.  In (3), is assumed to be concave, the set  is convex 
from the concavity of  is also assumed to be convex and the 
inequalities are linear.  Therefore, (3) is a concave programming problem and the 
Uzawa-Karlin Saddle Point Theorem is applicable.  Rewrite (3) as : 
)(uS })(:{ hu
hxhfhx ≥
kShxhf ),(
(A.5)  
},,,1,;,,1,)(f                                                   
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h
1 110,,
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1
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π
    
using the definitions (1) and (2).  From the definition (A.1), we have (4). 
 
Appendix III 
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   In this Appendix, we derive (10).  Premultiplying both sides of (9) by 
])(,0[ TzpTH , we have: 
(A.7)        .     tzqqBTzpzpzppBzqqBTzpzuzquBTzp )()(][)()()( =′+−′−
From (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) evaluated at )(),(,)((),,( zuzptzzpuqp += ), we have 
 and zquBTztTBuzquBTzpzqqBTztzqqBTzp −∇=−= )()(,)( TNzppBTzp 0)( = . 
Substituting these equations into (A.7), we have (10). 
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